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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This appeal is from a final decision of the Utah State Tax
Commission.
This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) and 63-46b-16(2)(a).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
ISSUE I.

The Tax Commissions finding that the exemption

granted in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(20) did not apply was
reasonable.
Standard of Review;

The standard of review is "abuse of

discretion" because the Commission was granted express and
implied discretion by statute.
ISSUE II. The Tax Commissions assessment on OSI's use of a
liquid nitrogen spray in its manufacturing process was reasonable
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(1) and Utah Code Admin. P.
R865-19-29S(1B).
Standard of Review: The standard of review is "abuse of
discretion" because the Commission was granted express and
implied discretion by statute.

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Basic tax provisions;
§ 59-12-103(1)(1), Utah Code Ann.,

as amended.

§ 59-12-103/ sales and use tax base - rate:
There is levied a tax on the purchaser for
the amount paid or charged for the following:
(1) tangible personal property stored, used,
or consumed in this state.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(20) (Cum. Supp. 1991):
The following sales and uses are exempt from
the taxes imposed by this chapter:

(20) sprays and insecticides used to control
insects, diseases, and weeds for commercial
production of fruits, vegetables, feeds,
seeds, and animal products;

Section 59-12-118, Utah Code Ann., as amended.
Section 59-12-118 "[t]he administration of
this chapter is vested in and shall be
exercised by the Commission which may
prescribe forms and rules to conform with
this chapter for the making of returns and
for the ascertainment, assessment, and
collection of the taxes imposed under this
chapter."
Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19-29S(1B) (1991-1992):
Tangible personal property or services which
are purchased by a manufacturer or compounder
which do not become and remain an integral
part of the article being manufactured or
compounded are subject to sales or use tax.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission
assessed use tax deficiency for OSI's use of liquid nitrogen in
its meat processing plant.

The Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax

Commission") issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Final Decision affirming the Auditing Division's assessment.

The

audit period included calendar years 1988, 1989 and 1990. The
amount of tax, interest and penalty for the audit period was
$230,234.65.

OSI argued that the purchases fit within the

exemption in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(20) as a spray and
insecticide for production of animal products.

OSI now appeals

the Final Decision of the Tax Commission.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts listed in the Brief of Petitioner
substantially represents the facts in this case as stipulated
prior to hearing and subsequent thereto.

However, the facts the

Commission found relevant to its decision and are not contested,
should be emphasized.
The Petitioner operates a meat processing plant which
produces ground beef and pork patties for sales to McDonald's
Restaurants.

The patties are made from bulk meat which is

supplied to the Petitioner from other sources.

(Tax Commission

Final Decision p. 1.)
In the process of producing the patties, liquid nitrogen is
3

sprayed onto the patties to flash freeze them to a very low
temperature.

The patties are then packed in containers and

placed in cold storage to maintain their hard frozen condition
while awaiting shipment in refrigerated vehicles to McDonald's
Restaurants.

(Tax Commission Final Decision p. 2.)

The freezing process is used to preserve the uniformity,
freshness, quality and purity of the patties and also acts as a
retardant to spoilage.

(Tax Commission Final Decision p. 2.)

During the audit period in question, the Petitioner
purchased its liquid nitrogen from its vendors and did so without
paying sales tax on the purchase price.

The Petitioner

maintained that the use of liquid nitrogen constituted a "spray"
used in the production of animal products and thus was exempt
from taxation as provided for by Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(20).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
OSI relied upon Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(20) as providing
it with an exemption from the Tax Commission's assessment.
Contrary to OSI's contentions, this exemption does not apply.
OSI contends that liquid nitrogen qualifies as an exemption under
this section which exempt "sprays and insecticides use to control
insects, diseases, and weeds for commercial production of fruits,
vegetables, feeds, seeds and animal products."
The Tax Commission correctly interpreted Utah Code Ann. §
59-12-104(20).

The exemption statute is to be construed as a
4

comprehensive whole and not piecemeal.

Morton Int'l, Inc. v.

Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 591 (Utah 1991).

When this

exemption is read as a whole, its clear intent is to exempt
sprays and insecticides used in agricultural production.
The Tax Commission assessed OSI for its use of a liquid
nitrogen spray in processing manufactured meat patties for
McDonald's restaurants.

This assessment was correct pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(1) which taxes "tangible personal
property stored, used or consumed in this state."

During OSI's

use, the liquid nitrogen spray is entirely consumed.

None of the

spray becomes an ingredient or component of the final product.
The proper standard of review under the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act is the "abuse of discretion" standard.

OSI's use

of liquid nitrogen spray in its manufacturing process does not
come within the ambit of the exemption.

Even if the "correction

of error" standard were applied, the Tax Commission should be
sustained.
OSI's interpretation of § 59-12-104(20) should not be
allowed under the well established principle of taxation which
requires tax exemptions to be strictly construed against the
taxpayer and in favor of the taxing authority.

Parsons Asphalt

Products v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980).
Under this principle, OSI's broad reading of § 59-12-104(20)
cannot stand, and the Tax Commission's decision should be
affirmed.
5

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TAX COMMISSION CORRECTLY FOUND THAT OSI DOES NOT
FALL WITHIN THE SALES AND USE TAX EXEMPTION UNDER THE
UTAH CODE ANN. S 59-12-104(20).
A.

THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER UAPA IS THE
-ABUSE OF DISCRETION" STANDARD. THUS, THE TAX
COMMISSION'S DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED UNLESS
EXACT ITS ACTION IS FOUND TO BE UNREASONABLE.

Discussing the standard of review under UAPA, the Utah
Supreme Court Stated:
Under UAPA, this court reviews an agency decision which
interprets statutory law using the correction of error
standard found in section 63-46b-16(4)(d), unless the
legislature has granted the agency discretion in
interpreting and administering the statute. Agency
discretion may be either express or implied and, if
granted, results in review of the agency action for an
abuse of discretion under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i).
Nucor Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 187 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18
(Utah 1992) (footnotes omitted)1

See King v. Industrial Comm'n,

No. 920464-CA, (Utah App., March 18, 1993).

Thus, if either

express or implied discretion is found, the proper standard of
review is § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) Utah Code Ann. which provides:
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:

l

The Supreme Court has also stated, "[i]n many cases where we
would summarily grant an agency deference on the basis of its
expertise, it is also appropriate to grant the agency deference on
the basis of an explicit or implicit grant of discretion contained
in the governing statute." Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of
the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991). See also
King v. Industrial Comm'n, No. 920464-CA, (Utah App., March 18,
1993).
6

(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the
agenry by statute; . . . .
The standard of review appellate courts apply under § 6346b-16(4)(h)(i) is one of "reasonableness".

The Utah Supreme

Court stated, "[I]n past cases, we have held that an agency has
abused its discretion when the agency's action, viewed in the
context of the language and purpose of the governing statute, is
unreasonable."

Morton at p. 587 (footnote omitted).

In the case at bar, the Commission has been granted both
express and implied discretion to interpret the relevant
statutes.

Utah's Sales and Use Tax Act provides, "[T]he

administration of this chapter is vested in and shall be
exercised by the Commission which may prescribe forms and rules
to conform with this chapter for the making of returns and for
the ascertainment, assessment, and collection of the taxes
imposed under this chapter."

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-118 (1987).

The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that by enacting § 59-12-118
"[t]he legislature has granted the Commission discretion in
administration of the tax code generally."

Putvin v. Utah State

Tax Comm'n, 837 P.2d 589 (Utah App. 1992).

Recently the Utah

Court of Appeals reiterated both an explicit and implicit grant
of discretion by statute.

Kino v. Industrial Commission, No.

920464-CA slip op. at 10 (Utah App. March 18, 1993).
7

The King

case is included as Appendix 1 to this brief.
Should this Court find no explicit grant of discretion, it
is clear that the Tax Commission has also been granted implied
discretion to interpret and apply the relevant statutes. First,
the terms of the exemption statute at issue are broad enough to
be open to interpretation by the Tax Commission.

In Morton this

Court stated, "we had held that when the operative terms of a
statute are broad and generalized, these terms bespeak a
legislative intent to delegate their interpretation to the
responsible agency."

Morton, 581 P.2d at 588 (citation omitted).

The Tax Commission did not abuse its discretion in applying
the facts and finding OSI's use of liquid nitrogen was beyond the
intended limits of the exemption.
Should this Court determine that deference not be given to
the Tax Commission's Final Decision, ample evidence exists in the
record at the formal hearing and in the stipulated facts for this
Court to affirm the final decision of the Tax Commission on its
own merits.

No error was committed in the findings of fact and

conclusions of law in the decision of the Tax Commission.

The

Tax Commission correctly applied the rule of noscitur a. sociis
from the Morton case (Tax Commission Final Decision p. 4) and
using that rule when it concluded, "when applying that rule of
statutory construction to the present case, it becomes clear that
the word 'sprays' is meant to be a substance which is used in the
same manner as an insecticide or herbicide which may be applied
8

to agricultural or animal products to prevent or destroy
diseases.

Here, the liquid nitrogen is not an insecticide or

herbicide and the only reason it would qualify under the
exemption as proposed by the Petitioner is that it is sprayed
upon the meat patties."

(Tax Commission Final Decision p. 4.)

The Tax Commission went on to state, "Admittedly, the liquid
nitrogen, when used to freeze the meat patties, helps to prevent
and retard the growth of bacterial micro-organisms which lead to
spoilage.

This natural process of spoilage however does not

constitute a 'disease' as contemplated under this statute. As
used in the statute, the word 'diseases', implies an external
force such as infection, that creates an abnormal impairment of a
plant or animal's normal functions.

It does not imply the

natural decay of agricultural or animal products."

(Tax

Commission Final Decision p. 5.)
Common sense would limit the application of the exemption to
the "growing" end of food production, not the "consumption" end.
Basically, the liquid nitrogen used by the Petitioner freezes the
processed food as hard as a brick so that it can be stored,
shipped, and stored again before it is finally grilled for a
McDonald's customer.

Certainly, no error was committed in

finding this process outside the intentions of the exemption.
B.

THE TAX COMMISSION WAS CORRECT IN FINDING OSI'S
USE OF LIQUID NITROGEN DOES NOT FIT WITH THE
REASONABLE MEANING OF § 59-12-104(20).

OSI claims that its use of liquid nitrogen falls within the
9

exemption granted in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(20) (Supp. 1991)
which exempts "sprays and insecticides used to control insects,
diseases, and weeds for commercial production of fruits,
vegetables, feeds, seeds and animal products."
without merit.

OSI's argument is

No weeds or insects are affected by their liquid

nitrogen.
As there is no substantive legislative history on this
specific exemption, one must turn to rules of statutory
construction to find the proper interpretation of this exemption
statute.2

A fundamental rule of statutory construction requires

the words of a statute to be construed as a comprehensive whole
and not piecemeal.

See, e.g., Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing

Division, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991); and Amax Magnesium Corp. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990). OSI's
interpretation violates this rule of statutory construction.
Additionally, the Tax Commission's use tax assessment
against OSI is consistent with the "well-established principle
that tax exemption statutes are to be strictly construed against
the party claiming the exemption and all ambiguities are to be
resolved in favor of taxation."

Morton, 814 P.2d at 591. Even

2

The Legislature established this exemption in 1957. This was
before the legislative proceedings were recorded which began in
1959.
Therefore, there is no record of legislative intent when
this exemption for insecticides first went into effect. The only
other significant singular change made to this exemption was in
1987 when the sales and use taxes were consolidated into the same
section.
10

though taxing statutes should generally be construed favorable to
the taxpayer and strictly against the taxing authority, the
reverse is true of exemptions.

Statutes which provide for

exemptions should be strictly construed, and one who so claims
has the burden of showing his entitlement to the exemption.
Parson Asphalt Products v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397,
398 (Utah 1980); Morton, 814 P.2d at 591. Under a strict
construction, OSI's interpretation of § 59-12-104(20) cannot
stand.

Only by dissecting and torturing the words contained in

the exemption statute can the Petitioner logically argue for
inclusion in the pesticide and insecticide exemption.
Petitioner's brief goes to great length to define a number
of terms that show the potentially expansive application of the
exemption phrase.

The problem with this approach is that by so

misconstruing the terms, the phrase can be extended to its
logical absurdity resulting in the inclusion of such materials as
water used for washing fruits, vegetables and other produce, and
any preservatives which might be applied to food products.
Common sense application of the statute, with references to weeds
and insects, and fruits and vegetables, logically confines its
scope to agricultural production.
Because every possible factual example cannot be defined by
statute, it is the administrative agency's responsibility to
examine the facts of a case to determine if they come within the
logical limits of the statute.

Preservatives retard or terminate
11

the growth of microorganisms which are in themselves diseased or
which produce toxins that become diseases when ingested.
Freezing food products retards spoilage and allows their
transportation over long distances increasing their usefulness
and commercialization.

The Commission was correct in concluding

that this process for presentation and handling did not come
within the language of the exemption.
This Court should reference the final decision by the Tax
Commission in reference to this argument:
By reading each of the words set forth in
subsection 20 and defining them, not within
the context of which they are used, but
singularly and standing alone, one might
arrive at the interpretation the Petitioner
argues for. To do so however, violates the
rule of statutory construction set forth by
the Utah Supreme Court in [Morton]. There,
the Utah Supreme Court stated that the rule
of noscitur a. sociis, provides that the
meaning of questionable words and phrases in
a statute be ascertain by reference to the
words or phrases associated with them.
(Tax Commission Final Decision p. 4.)
A lengthy portion of Petitioner's brief is spent in
describing what the legislature "could have" or "should have"
done in regard to drafting the language of the exemption.

As

Petitioner correctly points out, there are no legislative notes
or explanations relating to the drafting and passage of the
statutory language to shed light on the limits of the exemption
(see footnote 2, supra).

But the Petitioner argues on one hand

that microanalysis of each word in the exemption is necessary to
12

promote the inclusion of liquid nitrogen within its meaning
(Petitioner's brief at pp. 14-17), and on the other hand
macroanalysis of conjunctive phrases or the exemption as a whole
should not be applied if it works against the Petitioner's
interest (Petitioner's brief at p.18).
Morton involved a taxpayer which had constructed
manufacturing facilities to produce sodium azide pellets and
igniter material which were components of the crash protection
air bag system used in automobiles.

The taxpayer argued that its

expenditures in constructing these facilities were exempt under
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (1987) which exempted:
sales or leases of materials, machinery,
equipment, and services of any person in
excess of $500,000 for any tax year used in
the new construction, expansion, or
modernization . . . of any mine, mill,
reduction works, smelter, refinery (except
oil and gas refineries), synthetic fuel
processing and upgrading plant, rolling mill,
coal washing plant, or melting facility . . .
Id. at 589 (original emphasis).
The taxpayer in Morton contended that "the sodium azide
pellets are synthetic fuels and that, therefore, Morton's
facilities constitute a 'synthetic fuel processing and upgrading
plant' as that term is used in section § 59-12-104(15)."
589.

Id. at

Morton argued, like OSI's argument in its brief, that the

dictionary definition of the terms "synthetic" and "fuel" when
combined, was broad enough to include the sodium azide pellets
within the statutory language of a "synthetic fuel."
13

JEcL at 590.

The Morton court found that this would lead to absurd
results and turned to other rules of statutory construction.

The

court stated:
One such method of statutory construction is
the rule of noscitur a, sociis, which provides
that the meaning of questionable words and
phrases in a statute be ascertained by
reference to words or phrases associated with
them. The terms surrounding "synthetic fuel
processing and upgrading plant" all relate to
different aspects of the mining or material
reclamation operations. This suggests that
the term "synthetic fuel processing and
upgrading plant" should be interpreted in
accordance with the term's relationship to
the mining industry.
Id. at 590-91 (footnote omitted).3
When examining § 59-12-104(20) as a whole, the general
intent behind the statute is that sprays and insecticides are
exempt when used in agricultural production.

It is only by

dissecting § 59-12-104(20), in violation of a fundamental rule of
statutory construction, that OSI circumvents the general intent
of the statute thus enabling it to claim an exemption.

However,

a common sense approach would not lead one to conclude that § 5912-104(20) exempts a liquid nitrogen spray used to freeze meat

3

See also Dole v. United Steel Workers of America, 494 U.S.
26, 36 (1990) ("The traditional canon of construction noscitur a
sociis, dictates that 'words grouped in a list should be given
related meaning.'") (citations omitted); Salt Lake City v.
International Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786, 791 (Utah 1977)
("Under the rule of interpretation, noscitur a sociis, which
teaches that terms should be understood in the light of and take
character from the associated terms, . . .")
14

patties.*
The rule of noscitur a sociis and the analysis in Morton
supports the Tax Commission's interpretation of § 59-12-104(20)
in this case.

This statute, when read as a whole and applying

the statutory construction rule of noscitur a sociis, exempts
only those sprays and insecticides used in agricultural
production.
The Tax Commission relied on its finding that the liquid
nitrogen, was primarily used for preservation of the product
during transportation rather than a spray used to "control
insects, diseases, and weeds."

This conclusion is logical in

light of the many methods used to preserve food products from the
manufacturer or processor to the marketplace.

Therefore, when

§ 59-12-104(20) is examined as a comprehensive whole, its
language does not cover OSI's use of a liquid nitrogen spray to
freeze meat patties.
II.

THE TAX COMMISSION CORRECTLY ASSESSED OSI ON ITS USE OF
LIQUID NITROGEN PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-12103(1)(1).

The Tax Commission's deficiency assessment against OSI was a
proper calculation of sales or use taxes which OSI owed the Tax
4

"The object of statutory construction is to give a sensible
and practical meaning to the statute as a whole in order that it
may be applied in future cases without difficulty . . . and if a
literal interpretation leaves a result inconsistent with the
general statutory intention, such interpretation must give way to
the general intent. This is particularly true where such a literal
interpretation would lead to unjust and mischievous consequences."
Burpulis v. Director of Revenue, 498 A.2d 1082, 1087 (Del. 1985).
15

Commission for the audit period,

Utah taxes "tangible personal

property stored, used or consumed in this state" Utah Code Ann. §
59-12-103(1)(1) (1992).

The Tax Commission's Administrative Rule

also supports the assessment.

(Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19-

295(IB)(1991-1992)) . OSI purchased and used liquid nitrogen in
its production of hamburger patties for McDonald's.

OSI did not

pay sales or use tax on any of its purchases or uses of the
liquid nitrogen in its manufacturing process prior to the Tax
Commission's use tax assessment.

OSI's use of liquid nitrogen in

producing meat patties falls within the statute and should be
taxed pursuant to § 59-12-103(1)(1) since the liquid nitrogen is
used the process, then withdrawn from the process and discarded.
Both parties agree that the liquid nitrogen is consumed by OSI
and would be taxable unless it qualifies under the exemption
outlined in issue I above.

CONCLUSION
The Tax Commission acted in accordance with its statutory
authority in applying the exemption to the facts of this case.
When read as a whole, the exemption clearly is intended to apply
to insecticides and weed killers used in agricultural production
and does not logically include the flash-freezing process using
liquid nitrogen.

One with a common sense knowledge of farming

and ranching can sense the intent of the exemption when
incorporating, as the legislature did, words like weeds, insects,
16

fruits, vegetables, feeds and seeds. The exemption was meant to
cover substances at the growing end, not the consumption end of
the food chain.

This court should defer to the discretion of the

Tax Commission, or determine the matter on its own merits, and
affirm the Tax Commission's Final Decision.
DATED this 3Q

^ day of March, 1993.

Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDIX 1

This opinion is subject to revision before
publicauon in the Pacific Reporter.
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OPINION
(For Publication)

Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 920464-CA

The Industrial Commission of
Utah; Workers Compensation
Fund; and Superior Roofing
Company,

F I L E D
(March 1 8 , 1253)

Respondents.

Original Proceeding in this Court
Attorneye:
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BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
Petitioner Mark King seeks reversal of an Order of the
Industrial Commission of Utah denying bin temporary total
disability compensation for the period of his incarceration at
the Utah State Prison and for the period after his release until
corrective surgery was performed. We reverse and remand for the
calculation and payment of benefits*
FACTS
King suffered en on-the-job injury to his wrist on November
20, 1989, while working for Superior Roofing Company. King
received temporary total disability benefits from the Utah
workers' compensation Fund from Noveaber 21, 1989 through May 22,
1990. The Fund also paid medical expenses*
King was scheduled for surgery to correct his wrist injury
on May 30, 1990. However, on May 22, 1990, King was incarcerated

at tha Utah Stata Prison for a parola violation. Because of his
incarceration, surgery was postponed. Temporary total disability
compensation was terminated during the period of Xing'a
incarceration and for tha period after his release until
corrective surgery was performed. King was released from prison
on October 13, 1990. King was admitted for surgery on January
29, 1991 and surgery was performed en January 30, 1991.
Temporary total disability compensation resumed on January 29,
1991 and continued through July 14, 1991, covering the period of
King'8 surgery and recovery.
On July 9, 1991 an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied
King's claim for temporary total diaability benefita during the
period from May 22, 1990 through January 28, 1991. Tha ALJ
further ordered that the Workers' Compensation Fund was entitled
to a credit for all temporary total compensation paid to King
after Hay 22, 1990 and before January 29, 1991. The ALJ
determined King's "loss of wages for the claimed period was not
related to the industrial accident whatsoever, but, rather, was
solely due to the actions or conduct of the applicant which
resulted in his being incarcerated." The Industrial Commission
affirmed tha order of the ALJ. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal, King seeks temporary total disability
compensation for the period between Kay 22, 1990 and January 28,
1991, the period of his incarceration and tha period after his
release until corrective surgery was performed. King contends
tha Industrial Commission erroneously interpreted and applied the
workers' compensation statutes in denying him compensation.
Because the proceedings in this case began after January 1,
1988, we review them under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
(UAPA).fifi£Utah Code Ann. $$ 63-46b-0.5 to -22 (1989 k Supp.
1992). Judicial review of agency action under UAPA is controlled
by Utah Code Ann. $ 63-46b-16 (1989). Section 4 of that atatute
enumerates the aituationa under which a court can grant relief.1
1. That section provides:
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief
only if, on the basis of the agency's record,
it determines that a peraon seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or tha
statute or rule on which the agency
(continued..*)
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Becauaa tha controlling precedent from the Utah Supreme

1.

(...continued)
ection la baaed, is
unconatitutional on ita face or aa
applied;
(b) the agency haa acted beyond the
juriadiction conferred by any
etatute;
(c) the agency has not decided all
of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency haa erroneously
interpreted or applied the lav;
(a) tha agency haa engaged in an
unlawful procedure or decisionmaking process, or haa failed to
follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency
action ware illegally conatituted
aa a decision-making body or were
subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon
a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not
supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
<i) an abuse of the
discretion delegated to
the agency by statute;
(ii) eontrary to a rule
of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the
agency's prior practice,
unless the agency
justifies the
inconsistency by giving
facta and reasons that
demonstrate a fair and
rational basis for the
inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary
or eapricious.
Utah Code Ann. $ 63-46b-16 (1989).
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Court is less than clear* and bacaust of divergence in recent
opinions of this court over hov we discern the appropriate
standard of review under UAFA, we take the opportunity today to
discuss the issue in depth.
Compare Putvin V, Tax CglMfl'T), 837
P.2d 589 (Utah App. 1992)3 (finding grant of discretion in broad
statutory language without identifying whether it was explicit or
implicit) with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Tax Comm'n. 207 Utah Adv.
Rep. 23, 24 & n.6 (Utah App. 1993)4 (finding no explicit grant of
discretion because no statutory directive to interpret a tern).
We feel compelled to take this approach due to the admonitions
this court recently received from the supreme court in state v.
Thurman. 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1993). In that case, which
resolved a conflict in this court regarding the standard of
review applicable in certain criminal matters, the supreme court
noted its
uneasiness with the persistence of the
division in the court of appeals on this
[standard of review] issue. To the extent
that this disagreement simply represents an
evolution of two conflicting interpretations
of the same legal doctrine by different
panels of judges, its persistence is contrary
to the doctrine of stare decisis. . . *
. . . It is one thing to admit that
differences among judges en a particular
legal question can exist; it is quite enother
to sanction variability in the rule of law
depending solely on which of several judges
of an appellate court sit on a given case.
id. at 25. Thus, to eliminate any confusion as to the analytical
model this court is following to determine the appropriate
standard of review under UAPA, we engage in a rather laborious
discussion of the standard of review.

2. CI. State v. Thurman. 203 Utah Adv. Rep* 18, 24-25 (Utah
1993} (acknowledging supreme court's failure to clearly
articulate standards of review).
3. Opinion by Judge Billings with Judges Jackson and Russon
concurring.
4. Opinion by Judge Bench with Judge Carff concurring and Judge
Russon concurring in the result only.
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A.

Xssuas of Fact

Under UAFA, the standard we apply when reviawing factual
findings is clear. Tha only subaaction under which factual
findings can be challenged is 63-46b-16(4)(g). Under that
subsection, we will change a factual finding only if it "is not
supported by substantial evidence
whan viewed in light of tha
vhol* record befora the court.*1 Utah Code Ann* S 63-46b-16(4) (g)
(1689). &£££!£ 2i«»i v. Tax ceB?r'n. 196 Utah Adv. Hep. 15, 16
(Utah 1992). "^Substantial evidence is that which a raasonabla
person "night accept as adequate to support a conclusion."'"
Stewart v. Board of Review. 831 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1992)
(quoting Marriam v. Beard offtavi«v.812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah App.
1991) (quoting grace PrilUpq Co- V, Board Of, Pevjiw, "776 P.2d
63, 68 (Utah App. 1989))). To reach our conclusion w« examine
the entire record available to the court, not simply that which
supports the findings of the ALJ. J£. Thus, Petitioner
necessarily has the burden of marshaling "all of the evidence
supporting tha findings and show[ing] that despite tha supporting
facts, and in light of tha conflicting or contradictory avidanca,
the findings are not supported by substantial avidanca." Grace
Prilling* '?« P.2d at 68. Accord Hales Sand a Gravel Tnc. v. Tax
comn'n. 842 P.2d 887, 890 (Utah 1992). This review is not as
strict as a de novo review of tha proceedings, nor as lenient as
a review for "any competent evidence" to support the findings, it
simply accords deference to the agency where two reasonable, yet
conflicting, conclusions could have been reached. See Grace
Drilling. 776 P.2d at 68 t n.7.
Additionally, tha Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure govern
how we review agancy actions. &ftl Utah Coda Ann. § 63-46b16(2)(b) (1989). Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rulas of Appellate
Procedure provides: "If the appellant intends to urge on appeal
that a finding or conclusion is unsupportad by er is contrary to
the avidance, the appellant shall include in tha record a
transcript ef all evidence relevant to such finding or
conclusion." Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2). Rule 11 requirea eeunsal
provide the appellate court with all avidanca pertinant to tha
issues on appeal. £lR panpson v. Richin?. 770 P.2d 998, 1102
(Utah App.), £i£lx djejliRdf 776 p.2d 916 (Utah 1999). Thus, our
procedural rulas specifically require a petitioner to provide a
tranacript of the proceedings if he is going to ehellange fectual
findings undar subsection €3-46b-16(4)(g). A petitioner Bust
alao provide a transcript if ha argues a legal conclusion is
unsupported by the avidence in the case, otherwise we hava no
basis on which to avaluata the findings and conclusions.
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B. Issues of General Lav
The standard ve apply when an agency interprets or applies
general law such as case law, constitutional law, or non-agency
specific legislative acts is also clear. Our review in this area
is guided by section 63-46b-l6(4)(d). As ve did prior to UAPA,
we review agency interpretations of general lav "under a
correction of error standard, giving no deference to the agency's
decision," Q u m a r Pipeline Ct>, v- Tm Cww'nr «17 *.2d 316, 318
(Utah 1991). See flli? Zilfj v, TSX CPFff'n, 19« Utah Adv. Rep.
IS, 16 (Utah 1992} (holding issues of law are reviewed for
correctness under S 63-46b-l6(4)(d)); Savage Indus.. Inc. v. Tax
Comm'n. 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991) (finding agency's erroneous
interpretation of law is grounds for relief under $ 63-46b-

16(4) (d)). in MPrtPn international, iPPt, yf Auditing Pivifipn,

814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), the supreme court articulated the
reason for the correction of error standard is not simply because
the court characterizes an issue as one of general law but
because the agency has no special experience or expertise placing
it in a better position than the courts to construe the law. ££.
at 586.
C. Issues of Agency-Specific Lav
We are faced with a far more difficult task in deciding the
amount of deference to grant an agency's interpretation or
application of agency-specific statutory law. In that instance,
we grant deference only "when there is a grant of discretion to
the agency concerning the language in question, either expressly
made in the statute or implied from the statutory language." Idat 589.* if there is a grant of discretion we review the agency
5. Prior to UAPA ve reviewed agency determinations under three
distinct categories• While the standards for factual
determinations and interpretations of general law remain the
same, it is this intermediate area of scrutiny that has changed.
Formerly
agency decisions involving mixed questions of
lav and fact or the application of specific
factual situations to the legislative
enactments under which the agency operates
were to be given deference by the courts and
were to be upheld so long as they fell within
the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.
Savaoe Indus.. Inc. v. Tax Conun'n.. 811 P.2d 664, 667 (Utah
1991) • We spent far less time grappling vith the standard of
review under this relatively simple analysis. The complexities
involved in the new analysis seem not/ in the end, to make a
significant enough difference for the amount of energy ve expend.
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action under Utah Cod* Ann S «3-4«b-i«(4)(h)(i) (1989). £**
Chicago Bridoa I Iron Co. v. T » Y eonm'n, 196 Utah Adv. Sap. 18,
20 (Utah 1992). Whart a grant axists, va vill not disturb tha
agency's Intarpratation or application of tha law unlass ita
determination exeseds the bounds of raasonablanass and
rationality. Morton. 814 P.2d at 586-87, 589, 592; Croii v.
Board of Review. 824 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah App. 1992). "[AJbsent
a grant of discretion, a correction-of-error standard is used in
reviewing an agency's interpretation or application of a
statutory term." MfirJfcoja, 814 P.2d at 588. See also Hor-riO
Indue., Inc. v. Board of Review. 817 P.2d 328, 330 (Utah App.
1991), eert, dgniid, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). In Other words,
we review agency interpretation or application of agency-specific
statutes where no grant of discretion exists under Utah Code Ann.
S 63-46b-16(4) (d). See Bennion v. Crahain RwoureM. Inc.. No.
910089, slip op. at 2 (Utah March 4, 1993).
The difficulty arises in determining whether an agency has
been granted discretion and thus whether our review is governed
by section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i). In Morton. the supreme court
reviewed the impact of UAPA on the standard of review an
appellate court should utilize when an agency interprets er
applies an agency-specific statute. Morton indicates that review
under section 63-46b-l6(4)(h)(i) represents a "break from prior
lew." Bsi&fin., 814 P.2d at 588.* It held "an agency's statutory
6. Appaals under the various subsections of 63-46b-16(4) are
subject to various standards of review. For example, in Union
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Tax Commission, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 13
(Utah 1992), the railroad challenged some determinations of the
Tax Commission. One challenge was to a rule of the Commission
under section 63-46b-l6(4)(h)(ii). Citing a pre-UAPA case the
court held that rules promulgated by the agency and departures
from those rules will be upheld If they are reasonable and
rational. 2fl. «t 14. The court engeged in no discussion of
explicit or implicit granta of discretion. The court also held
the railroad's challenge to the constitutionality of a sales tax
under section 63-46b-l6(4)(a) vould be reviewed for correctness.
Id. at 15.
Thus, Morton applies only when ve are ascertaining whether
an appeals is brought under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) or 63-46b16(4)(d). See also pucpr Cprpt v, TflX CQWn'n* §32 **2d 1294
(Utah 1992) (noting review for abuse of agency discretion vas
under section 63-46b-16(4) (h) (i)),* Andereon v. Public Service
Contain, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992) (noting review of claims that
agency action vas arbitrary and capricious under section 63-46bl6(4)(h)(iv) is for reasonableness)* Because the standard of
review under UAPA will vary based on the subsection the claim is
(continued...)
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sonstruction should be given deference when there ie e grant of
discretion to the agency concerning the language in question,
fcither expressly made in the statute or implied from the
itatutory language." Id. at 589. However, Morton does not
detail what the term explicit grant of discretion means. In
worton. the example of an explicit grant of discretion to an
igsncy relates to the Tax Commission deciding whether a piece of
•guipment qualifies for an exemption from the sales and use tax.
Id. at S88 n.40. The statute allows the exemption if the
aguipment is a "normal operating replacement . . . »• determined
by tha coimiiesion." Utah Code Ann. S 59-12-104(15) (1992)
(emphasis added). Thus, an explicit grant of discretion can be
found when a statute specifically authorizes an agency to
interpret or apply statutory language.
Morton also discusses when an implicit grant of discretion
is present. He can find implicit grants of discretion in "broad
and generalized" statutory language because such language
indicates a legislative intent to delegate interpretative powers
to the agency. Morton. 614 P.2d at 588. Articulated somewhat
differently, if we find there are multiple permissible
interpretations of statutory language we must defer to the
agency's policy choice, Id* et S69. However, if we can derive
the legislative Intent in the statute by "traditional methods of
statutory construction, [there is no implicit grant of discretion
and] the agency's interpretation will be granted no deference and
the statute will be interpreted in accord with its legislative
intent." Id. at 589.
In one of its more confusing sections, Morton tells us "to
the extent that our cases can be read as granting deference to an
agency's decisions based solely on the agency's expertise," they
are inconsistent with UAPA's command that ws defer only on the
basis of a statutory grant of authority. Morton. 814 P.2d at S87
(emphasis added). The court then immediately responds to this
statement by recognizing the changes it discusses in standard of
review "may not have significant effect."
Id* We take this to
mean that consideration of an agency's expertise and experience
is relevant in determining whether the egency should make the
necessary policy choice and thus be granted deference by the
6. (••.continued)
brought under, we strongly encourage counsel to clearly identify
under what section review is bsing sought and to make certain
they identify the appropriate standard of review under that
section. ££. Bhatia v. Departwnt of employment 8ac. 894 P.2d
574, 581-82 (Utah App. 1992) (Bench, P.J., concurring)
(encouraging counsel to present an appropriate statutory
construction in UAPA cases).
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raviawing court.7 B£££fin epecifically stataa it should not ba
raad as holding the vaya of finding granta of diseration which it
diseuaaes "are tha only method* of determining whether tha
legislature has grantad tha agancy discretion in daaling with an
issus." JSaiXsn* 814 P.2d at 589.
Harlan's diraetiva that va aaak out granta of diacration
bafora applying tha deferential atandard of review undar 63-46b16(4)(h)(i) has lad this court to axpand aignificant judicial
raaouress on aacartaining tha appropriate atandard of raviaw in
appaala from executive agancy daciaiona. Two aonavhat diffarant
approaches have ariaan in this court following Morton. Given the
•merging nature of the law, this result is not surprising.
Tha approach this court originally took is exemplified by
Tastara Ltd. v. Department of Employment Saeuri-fcv. 819 P.2d 361

7. Thia conclusion that agency expertise and experience remain
appropriate considerations when assaaaing whether to grant
deference is supported by Sandere Brine Shrimp v. Tax Commission.
No. 910106 (Utah Jan. 28, 1993) and Board of Equalisation v. Tax
Commission. No 910256 (Utah Jan. 20, 1993). In both casea, the
supreme court citaa a pre-Morjfcojj non-UAPA caae, Chris i, bick'e
Lumber t Hardware v. Tax Commieeion. 791 P.2d 511 (Utah 1990),
for tha proposition that "(wje giva no deference to an
administrative agency's interpretation of a statute
ebsent
certain circumstancea, none of which exist hsre.M Sanders. slip
op. at 3; Board of Eguallzatlon. slip op. et 4. The
circumstancea referenced in Chria t pick'a are thoae instances
where the agency's expertise should ba deferred to. chrie a
Pick's. 791 P.2d at 513-14.
Further, a footnote in Zlaai v. Tax Commiesion. 198 Utah
Adv. Rep. 15, (Utah 1992), a poet-Kfixfcfin UAPA eass, alao supports
this conclusion. In that footnote the supreme court rejects
applying an intermediate standard of review based in part on the
rationale that "the issues are queations of constitutional law
and statutory conatruction on which the Commission's experience
and expertise will be of no real aaaistsnca.** 26* *t 21 n.2.
The JEifii footnote reliea on silver v. Tax commieelon. S20 P.2d
912 (Utah 1991), and Sandv City v. Salt Lake County. 627 P.2d 212
(Utah 1992), to support this proposition. Silver is a pre-UAPA
case and sandv city did not involve an agency of the state, thus,
UAPA would not epply even if that ease arose today.
gandfrs, Board of ggu«li«ation. and ZiuJL ell indicate
agency experience and expertise are still relevant considsrations
in deciding whether there is a grant of discrstion in eases
arising under UAPA.
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(Utah App. 1991).' In Tasten. the issue was the Department's
interpretation and application of Utah Code Ann. S 35-4-22(j)(5)
(Supp. 1989) (current version at i£. S 35-4-22.3 (Supp. 1992)).
That statute directs the Department to consider twenty factors in
determining if an individual is an employee or an independent
contractor, we found the language of the statute directing the
agency to apply the statute "indicates an explicit grant of
discretion" to the agency to determine whether an individual is
an employee or an independent contractor, Tasters. 819 P.2d at
364. The language the court relied on provided: "unless it is
shown to the satisfaction of the commission," the "[commission
determines that the] weight of the evidence supports the finding"
and "considered [by the commission] if applicable." Id. (quoting
Utah Code Ann. S 35-4-22(j)(5) (Supp. 1989)). Thus, the statute
in which we found an explicit grant of discretion authorised the
commission to apply specific statutory language.
Other panels have followed the analysis used in Tasters.
Recently, in Putvin v. Tax Commission, 837 P.2d 589 (Utah App.
1992),* the case turned on whether the petitioner met the
statutory definition of nonresident for Tax Code purposes. We
held the Tax Commission's determination was entitled to
deference. In doing so, we recognised a general grant of
authority to the Tax Commission to administer the statutes under
which it operates and that the Tax Commission often makes
determinations of residency status. Ifl. at 590. Thus, it could
be argued we found an explicit grant of discretion. He also,
however, recognized factors that would support a conclusion an
implicit grant of discretion had been given. First, ve
acknowledged neither the statutory context nor normal statutory
construction ware helpful in determining what the legislature
intended. ld_. at 591. Second, we recognized the statutory term
was subject to several possible interpretations and had been
defined by detailed administrative regulations. Id.. Thus,
interpretation of the statute was better left to the policy
expertise of the Commissi on."1
8. Opinion by Judge Jackson with Judges Carff and Greenwood
concurring.
9. Opinion by Judge Billings with Judges Jackson and RUBson
concurring.
10. Judge Bench has expressed a concern that what ve did in
Putyin was find an explicit grant of discretion to the Tax
Commission by virtue of Utah Code Ann. 5 59-12-118 (1992). fill
Belnorth Petroleum Corp. v. Tax Comm'n. 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 32
n.5 (Utah App. 1993). He agree the discretion we found in Putvin
is better characterized as an implicit grant under MflrjtffiQ.
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While ve have not always articulated why we have found a
grant of discretion or whether the discretion should be
characterised aa explicit or implicit, tha result has been
consistent with MsxiojQ. In each case the language of the statute
and the statutory scheme support a finding of at least an
implicit grant of discretion. For example, in Johnson-Bowles Co.
v. Department ef Coiwarca-. 829 P.2d 101 (Utah App.)," fifiXfcl

dinitd, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992), we granted deference to the
agency where its statutory schene provided the executive director
could penalize a broker "if he finds that" the broker has
"engaged in diahonest or unethical" practices. 2£. at 114
(guoting Utah Code Ann. $ €1-1-6(1) (1919)). We held such
language "bespeaks a legislative intent to delegate the
interpretation of what constitutes dishonest and unethical
practices in the securities industry . . . ." Id,. Hence,
although ve did not articulate it, what we did under Morton was
find the statutory language "broad and expansive" and capable of
multiple interpretations thus indicating an implicit grant of
discretion by the legislature.
Likewise, in Department ef Air Force v. Sw^der. 824 P.2d 448

(Utah App. 1991)," we did not articulate the exact stsp under
the H2i££D analysis where we found the agency had bean granted
discretion by the legislature. In SwlsJtf, an aircraft mechanic
had been discharged from employment at Hill Air Force Bese for
drug use. He applied for unemployment benefits and after a
hearing by an ALJ was granted them. The Board of Review upheld
the AU's decision. The Air Force challenged the Board's
conclusion the defendant was not "'culpable' for tha purposes of
establiahing a »ju«t cauae' termination*" Id- at 450. We found
statutory language permitting a denial of benefits if a
termination was for "»just causa . . . if so found bv the
commission*" constituted the requisite grant of discretion. I£.
at 451 (emphasis in original) (quoting Utah Code Ann S 35-45(b)(1) (Supp. 1991)). Under Kprj&n, this was the appropriate
result because the operative language authorized the Board to
interpret and apply specific statutory language. As the supreme
court noted would often be the case, the atandard of review Is
the same as that w« would have epplied under the prior approech
where we granted deference based on agency expertise. Morton,
814 P.2d at 588.

S«* also Bhatia v. Department of Emplovmant

11. Opinion by Judge Russon with Judges Jackson and Orme
concurring.
12. Opinion by Judge Orme with Judges Jackson and Russon
concurring.
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SUu., 834 P. 2d 574, 577 (Utah App. 1992)" (followingfialfltE)i
Robinson v. Depirtaant offt»plpvffi>ntSee.. 827 P.2d 250, 252

(Utah App. 1992) '* (finding explicit grant of diacration baaad on
statutory language authorizing agancy to determine issue of
"voluntariness" and -good cause"). S&S-&1M2 Valoardaon Houainc.
Svs. Inc. v. Tax Co»m'n. No. 920644, slip op. at 3-4 (Utah App.
March 12, 1993) (finding implicit grant of discration in Utah
Coda Ann. S 59-12-102(13) (1987)).

Recently, Judge Banch has articulated a slightly different
view of the appropriate analysis mandated by g&slfin. Under his
reading, the first question is whether there is an explicit grant
of discretion to the agency.'* Ferro v. Department of Commerce.
13. Opinion by Judge Billings with Judge Carff concurring and
Judge Bench concurring with opinion.
14. Opinion by Judge Garff with Judges Greenwood and Russon
concurring.
15.

Creative counsel might read Judge Bench's dissent in Luckau

v. Board of Revi«y. 840 P.2d 811 (Utah App. 1992) and his

concurrence in Bhatia as indicating we must look to see if the
statute is unambiguoua before we look for en explicit grant of
discretion.fiee.Lufikjau., 840 p.2d at 817 (Bench, P.J.,
dissenting); Bhatia. 834 P.2d at 581 n.4 (Bench, P.J.,
concurring).
The Luckau dissent cites language from Farro regarding
implicit grants of discretion in its assertion that ambiguity is
tha first step. £ee LucJULl, 840 P.2d at 817 (Bench, P.J.,
dissenting). In Ferro. the language cited in Luckau came after
Judge Bench's discussion of explicit grants of discretion and
before his discussion of implicit grants of discretion. See
££!££, 828 P.2d at 510. Thefihjiiafootnote cites Mor-Flo
Industries. Inc. v. Board of Bavlav. 817 P.2d 328 (Utah App.
1991) to support the assertion: "We may not defer to an agency's
interpretation until we know the legislature itself did not
render its own discemable statutory interpretation." Bhatia.
834 P.2d at 581 n.4 (Bench, P.J., concurring). While this
lenguage could be interpreted es reguiring an assessment of
ambiguity first, it does not appear to be what was intended. If
we followed that analysis, we would attempt to interpret the
statute whether there was a grant of discretion to the agency or
not.
Thus, we believe there it agreement that the court's first
task is to look for an explicit grant of discrstion. If we were
to Ignore an explicit grant of discretion and apply a plain
language test first, we would ignore the legislature's intent to
(continued...)
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828 P.2d 509, 510fin.5 (Utah App. 1992)M (citing Marian, 814
P.2d at 589). If there ia an explicit grant of discretion tha
court appllas a dafarantial atandard of raviaw.fiiiaiifi,834 P. 2d
at 581 (Band), p.j., concurring). Aa ona of tha Xays to this
analyst*, Judge Bench haa indieatad vhat ha thinks tha supreme
court scant whan it spoke of "axplieit grants of discretion." in
his view, that tarn means tha "legislature Bust diract or
authorise tha agency to define tha statutory tarm by rule."
2£.|7 If no axplieit grant axists than tha court determines
whathar tha statuta la ambiguous. ItXTfi* 828 P.2d at 510. If
not, tha court "applies tha ttatuta according to its plain
meaning." Id* I' tha statuta ia ambiguous tha court attempts to
apply tha traditional rules of statutory construction. Id. If
it can do so, and divine tha intant of tha legislature, it
applies a correction of error standard. Id. If traditional
atatutory construction does not produce a legislative intent the
court will then assuaa the legislature intended for the agency to
make a judgment concerning the appropriate policy and find an
implicit grant of discretion. Id- at 510-11.
There are two major distinctions between the enalyais Judge
Bench has recently advocated and that applied in some earlier
cases. First, opinions applying the earlier analyaie have found
explicit legislative grants of discretion in statutory language
which is much broader than simply a legislative directive to
define a term by rule, second, rather than applying plain
meaning and other statutory construction methods as independent
ateps in the analysis, the earlier opinions use statutory
construction as a tool in deciding whether the statute contains
an implicit grant of discretion.

15. (...continued)
grant the agency discretion.. Therefore, counsel should not read
Luckau. shatia. and Me>r-rio as requiring this court to assess
ambiguity prior to assessing whether a grant of discretion
exists.
IS. Opinion by Judge Bench with Judge Russon concurring and
Judge Billings concurring in the result only.
17. ss« also Chavron U.S.A.. Inc. v. Tax Coma'n. 207 Utah Adv
Pep. 23, 24 * n.6 (Utah App. 1993) (opinion by Bench, J.; Garff,
J., concurring; Russon, J., concurring in the result) (finding no
explicit grant under Judge Bench's definition); Beinorth
petroleum Corp. v. Tax Coum'n,. 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 30 (Utah
App. 1993) (Opinion by Bench, J.; Carff and Russon, JJ.,
concurring) (same).
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we turn now to Utah Suprana Court eaaaa to determine whether
thay hava applied the analysis articulated by Judge Bench or the
broader one used in the earlier opinions issued by this court.
Morton itself provides the answer. In footnote 40, the court
gives the following example of an explicit grant of discretion by
the legislature.
For example, section 59-12-104(16) provides
for "sales or leasts of machinery and
equipment purchased or leased by a
manufacturer for use in new or expanding
operations (excluding normal operating
replacements . . . as determined bv the
commi««joni-" (Emphasis added.)
Hoxten, 814 P.2d at 589 n.40. This illustration does not show a
specific legislative directive to define a statutory term by rule
as Judge Bench would require. Rather, it is a grant of authority
to the commission to interpret or apply statutory language. This
language constitutes the explicit grant of discretion that
requires a reviewing court to apply an intermediate standard of
review to agency ection under the statute.
Additionally, Morton twice states the question the court is
reviewing is one of "statutory construction or application, and
absent a grant of discration, the Commission's decision will be
reviewed" for correctness. 1£. at 589 « 592 (emphasis added).
Thus, it is not simply interpretation or definition of statutory
language we review under section 63-46b-i6(4)(h)(i), but
application of that language as well. Moreover, Morton discusses
agency actions in terms of "dealing with statutory terms" and
"dealing with an issue," not "interpreting" or "defining"
statutory terms. Sl& id. at 588 & 589. Likewise, nothing in the
language of section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) supports the limitation
Judge Bench proposes. Consequently, Morton refutes a cornerstone
of Judge Bench's analysis, that an explicit grant of discretion
can only be found in language directing the egency to define a
statutory term by rule.
Furthermore, in Union Pacific Railroad Cc. v. Tax
Commie*ion. 199 Utah Adv. Bap. 13 (Utah 1992), a post Morton
opinion, the Utah Supreme Court epplies the broader analysis. Zn
that case the railroad challenged some determinations of the Tax
Commission. The court, without identifying whether it found an
explicit or implicit grant of discretion, held the Commission had
discretion to N interpret the statutory terms "repairs" and
"renovations. JjJ. at 17. Regardless of whether the supreme
court found an explicit grant or an implicit grant, it looked for
a grant of discretion prior to construing the statute on its own,
as have our earlier opinions.
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In addition, the court has frequently found implicit grants
of discretion and has not applied statutory construction as a
separate step in its analysis. See, e.g.. g J - T l W Sfirv. yr Tax
Comro'n. 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 24 (Utah 1992) (holding Utah Code
Ann S 59-15-4(1) (Supp. 1986) (current version at id. S 59-12103(1)(a) (1992)) contains implicit grant of discretion); Chicago
Bridge t Iron Co. v. Tax Comm'n. 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 20 (Utah
1992) (applying reasonableness review to Tax Commission's
determination individual is a "real property contractor" beceuae
such determination is based in part on lav and in part on fact).
As with our earlier opinions, the supreme court uses statutory
construction as a tool in ascertaining whether an implicit grant
of discretion exists. See, e.o.. Kucor Corp. v. Tay Comn'n. 832
P.2d 1294 (Utah 1992) (applying reasonableness review to agency's
interpretation of statutory language based on implicit grant
because language subject to multiple interpretations).
He now articulate the analytical model we have derived from
Morton for determining if the more deferential standard of 6346b-l6(4)(h)(i) is to be utilized in reviewing an agency action.
This model applies In all UAPA cases dealing with either the
interpretation or application of agency-specific law by an
agency. First, we determine whether the legislature explicitly
granted deference to the agency to interpret or apply statutory
language at issue. As Judge Bench has rightly noted, we can find
an explicit grant of deference in specific statutory language
directing the agency to define a statutory term by regulation.
Additionally, a statute directing the agency to interpret or
apply specific statutory language should be interpreted as an
explicit grant of discretion. If we find such a grant, we review
under section 63-46b-i6(4)(h)(i) for abuse of discretion. That
is, ve afford the agency some deference and assess whether its
action is within the bounds of reasonableness.
Second, if ve do not find an explicit grant of discretion,
ve examine the language of the statute and the statutory
framework for an implicit grant of discretion." If the
statutory language is broad and expansive or subject to numerous
interpretations ve vill assume the legislature has chosen to
defer to the policy making expertise of the agency and ve will
find an implicit grant of discretion and review the action under
section €3-46b-16(4)(h)(i) for abuse of discretion. If, on the
18. Ve note, as the court did in Morton, the ways ve articulate
of finding a legislative grant of discretion are not exhaustive.
In the appropriate circumstances ve could find a grant of
discretion via an analysis yet unarticulated. See Morton. 814
P.2d at 589 (noting other methods of finding deference might
arise).
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other hand, the language is unambiguous and we can interpret and
apply the statutory language by the traditional methods of
statutory construction, utilizing our own expertise to divine the
legislative intent, ve review the agency action under section 6346b-16(4)(d) for correction of error.
Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-45 (1988) is the portion of the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act at issue here. Without articulating
the analysis we have set out above, ve have previously held
"section 35-1-45 does not expressly or impliedly grant discretion
to the Industrial Commission . . . .« croaa v. Board of Review.
824 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah App. 1992). hSSSXA Stokas v. Board of
Review. 832 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah App. 1992). This holding is in
harmony with the analysis we explain today.
Section 35-1-45 does not contain a directive to interpret or
apply a statutory term. Thus, it does not contain an explicit
grant of discretion. Further, because the language is not broad
and expansive but is narrow and mandatory and is subject to
construction by traditional rules of statutory construction, the
statute does not contain an implicit grant of discretion. We,
therefore, review the Industrial Commission's action under
section 35-1-45 under UAPA section 63-46b-16(4)(d) for
correctness. Accotd, Stokes. 832 P.2d at 58; £l£M&> *24 *•*<* •*
1204.
TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION
On appeal, King claims he has been denied his statutory
right to temporary total disability compensation. The Industrial
Commission argues King was appropriately denied benefits because
the extended period of his disability was due to his
"incarceration and the unavailability of medical care,
circumstances over which the defendants had no control." The
Industrial Commission concedes that workers' compensation
benefits should not be terminated merely as a result of
incarceration. Instead, the Commission, in denying benefits,
focuses on the extension of the period of King's disability as a
result of his incarceration.
A.

Workers' Compensation Act

Workers' compensation is a atatutorily-created benefit, ££&
Utah Code Ann. SS 35-1-1 to -107 (1988 6 Supp. 1992). Section
35-1-45 is the provision of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act
relevant in the instant ease. It providest
Each employee . . . who is injured . . .
by
accident arising out of and in the course of
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hia employment, wherever such Injury
occurred, if the aceidant was not purpoaaly
•elf-inflicted, ahall be paid goflmanaation

for loss sustained on account of tha injury
or death, and auch amount for medical, nurse,
and hospital aarvicas and medicines . . . .
Tha raaponaibility for compeneation and
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital
aarvieaa and medicines, and funaral sxpanaaa
providad undar this chaptar ahall ba on tha
employer and its insuranca earriar and not on
tha employee.
Ifl. S 35-1-45 (1988) (amphatis addad).
One* avarded, taaporary total workera' coapanaation benafita
"are to continue *until [tha claimant's] condition has
itablljzid.'" Booms v. Rapp Constr. Co.. 720 P.2d 1363, 1366
(Utah 1986) (quoting Entwistla v. Wllkina. 626 P.2d 495, 497

(Utah 1981)). Medical stabilitation is tha tiaa when »*the
pariod of haaling haa andad and tha condition of tha claimant
will not aatarially improve.'* Reddish v. Sentinel Consumer
£lfidL, 771 P.2d 1103, 1104 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting £££ffi£, 720
P.2d at 1366). "When a claimant raachaa aadieal stebiliration,
ha is no longar aligibla for taaporary benafita and his status
*ust ba reassessed." Griffith v. Industrial comm'n. 754 P.2d
981, 983 (Utah App. 1988). Medical stabilization la independent
of the ability of the claimant to return to work. Reddish. 771
P.2d at 1104. Thus, "temporary disability benefits are properly
discontinued aa aoon as the point of aedical stabiliiation is
reached, regardleas of whether the claimant is actually able to
return to work." Ifl.
King's injury did not achieve aedical stabilization until
corrective surgery waa parforaed. During the pariod of his
incarceration he was not aedically stabilised. Therefore, unless
an exception is applied, under the Utah workers' coapanaation
scheme, King qualifies for benefits for tha period of hia
incarceration and the period after his release until corrective
surgery wss performed.
B.

Incarcaration

Whether a claimant who la not aedically stabilised aay ba
denied taaporary total diaability compensation while incarcerated
is an iaaue of first impression in Utah. Other juriadiotions are
split on the Issue of whether one receiving workers' compensation
benefits loses those benefits upon incarceration. However, many
courts which have conaidered tha iaaue have concluded disability
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benefits should be paid to an incarcerated claimant." A review
of the reasoning articulated by some of the courts awarding
benefits is helpful in our resolution of this first impression
issue.
in re Sp«ra. 713 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1986), is a particularly
well-reasoned decision. Infipera.the claimant received
temporary total disability payments until January 21, 1985, the
date the district court learned he had been incarcerated. The
court ordered the suspension of further payments while the
claimant remained in jail. The district judge reasoned
incarceration, rather than the work-related
injury, was the legal
intervening cause of his lost wages.10 In reversing the district
court's suspension of payments, the Wyoming Supreme Court held a

19, See, c,SL, United Riggers Erectors v. Industrial Comm'n, $40
P.2d 189 (Ariz. App. 1981) (awarding benefits because
incarceration was not voluntary removal from job market and there
was no legislation taking away these benefits); Baarden v.
Industrial Comm'n. 483 P.2d 568 (Ariz. App. 1971) (holding right
to workers' compensation not forfeited during incarceration if
sentence less than life because no statute so provides and this
is an issue which should be determined by the legislature);
Crawford v. Midwest Steel Co.. 517 So.2d 918 (La. App. 1987)
(holding claimant entitled to benefits despite incarceration
because statute does not provide otherwise); DeMars v. Roadway
Express. Inc.. 298 N.W.2d 645, 647 (Mich. App. 1980) (affirming

total disability compensation despite felony conviction because
denial of benefits under such a situation "is not the province of
the Board or the judicial branch"); Forshee a Lanolav Logging v.
Peckham. 788 P.2d 487 (Or. App. 1990) (holding claimant entitled
to temporary total disability during incarceration because he was
never medically stationary nor released for work during
incarceration); Last v. MSI Conatr. Co.. 409 S.E.2d 334 (S.C.

1991) (awarding incarcerated claimant temporary total disability
benefits); In re Scera. 713 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1986) (holding under
contract principles incarcerated claimant should not be denied
temporary total benefits, which under the statute terminate only
when the worker recovers and regains his earning power). But see
State ex rel. Srtnnan v. Barrv. 594 N.E.2d 51 (Ohio App. 1991)

(holding employee not entitled to compensation during period of
incarceration); State ex vm\.

Ashcraft v. Induatrial Comm'n. 517

N.E.2d 533 (Ohio 1987) (denying temporary total disability
compensation because incarceration was "voluntary" act removing
claimant from work force).
20. Similarly, the ALJ denied Xing benefits on the basis his
incarceration was an intervening cause.
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worker's incarceration does not require a suspension of tenporary
total disability payment•. jfl. at 1158.
Stressing that workers' compeneation law is based on
"contract" rather than tort principles, thefifitXA.court held the
worker's right to benefits arises when he suffers a work-related
injury. £§£ Ad. at 1156-57. The court explained the Wyoming
workers' compensation scheme Mis based on e concept of industrial
insurance," which Beans "it is based on eontrect rather than tort
principles.*1 I£. at 1156. Under contract principles the worker
should not be denied benefits unless a provision in the statutory
contract between the worker, the state, and the employer
explicitly suspends the benefits. The court explains:
Instead of suing his employer for negligence
and having to prove duty, breach, proximate
cause, and damages, the worker in our state
must file for worker's compensation benefits
for which his employer is ultimately liable.
Essentially, the system provides disability
insurance coverage for the worker. His right
to benefits arises when certain conditions
precedent occur, primarily, when he suffers a
disabling work-related injury. Under
contract principles, the worker should not be
denied his benefits aftsr the contingency
arises, unless a provision in the statutory
contract between the worker, on the one hand,
and the State and employer, on the other,
explicitly suspends the benefits.
. . . Benefits under the statute
terminate only when the worker recovers
because only then does he regain his earning
power. Incarceration has no effect upon
benefits which are in the nature of insurance
which has beeome payable as a covered loss.
• • •
•

e

e

•

. • . The worker's disability payments
cannot be character!ted es mere governmental
largesse that can be eliminated when the
worker's needs are fulfilled from another
governnentel source. Rather, the worker's
statutory right to disability payments is
akin to a contract right. Kobody would
argue, in the private insurance context, that
an insurer could withhold payments due under
an insurance contract just because the
insured had a second policy which covered the
same disability. . . .
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We baliava thia same principla should
apply to industrial insurance craatad by
•tetute. Bacauaa thara is no statutory
axcaption which eliminates banafits vhan a
worker is jailed, tha banafita ara dua tha
vorkar svan if his naada ars fulfillad from
anothar govarmnantal source. Tha stata
legislature can changa our statuta to suapand
payments during parioda of incarceration,
much like a private inaurar might place
conditions on his coverage. But in the
absence of legislation, ve decline %h*
State's invitation to make that policy shift
pvrgglvtf.
Id- at 1157-58 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Baarden v. Industrial Commission, 463 P.2d 568
(Ariz. App. 1971), tha claimant was awarded temporary diaability
for a compensable Industrial injury and than incarcerated in the
Arizona state Prison following a felony conviction. The Arizona
Court of Appeala reversed the denial of benefits end held the
right to workers' compensation was not forfeited or suspended
during e period of incarceration. SJSJt id* •* 575. In reaching
this conclusion, the Baarden court reviewed relevant provisions
of Arizona'a workers' compensation atatutaa. Arizona's statutes
simply provided that benefits "ahall be paid." Ifl. at 573. The
court enumerated proviaions of tha statutes which suspended or
reduced workers1 compensation under specified circumstances- As
with Utah's statutes, Arizona's statutes contained no provision
for the forfeiture or suspension of workers' compensation
benefits based on incarceration. The court stated "the Arizona
Legislature has not provided for the forfeiture or suspension of
compensation and accident benefits during the period of the
priaon confinement of e claimant serving e sentence less than
lift."
Ifl. The Baarden court concluded:
No constitutional or statutory provision
relating directly to workmen's compensation
has been brought to our ettention which
declares that a person whose civil rights ere
suspended . • • thereby forfeits his right to
compensation • • • • Whether that should be
the law is a natter of public policy which
should be determined by the Legislature.
Jfl. at 573-74.
Likewise, in Porshea t Lanolev Logging v. Peekham. 7*8 P.2d
4*7 (Or. App. 1990), the claimant was awarded temporary total
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disability compensation prior to incarceration. Like King, the
claimant in Forahaa was neither medically stabilized nor released
for regular vork during the period of his incarceration. In
affining the award of benefits, the absence of legislation
specifically terminating benefits upon incarceration was
significant to the IftrsJue. court. *Xt is the legislature's
province to restrict the ability of incarcerated Individuals to
collect workers' compensation and, in sons situations, it has
done so. We decline eaployer's suggestion that ve create
additional exceptions that have no basis in the statute.** Id- at
468 (citation a footnote omitted).
Thus, the absence of a provision in the state's workers'
compensation statutes specifically denying disability benefits to
claimants during periods of Incarceration is a significant factor
in the analysis of many courts when awarding benefits to
incarcerated claimants.21 As with numerous other jurisdictions,
21. The absence of specific legislation providing for suspension
of workers' compensation benefits upon a claimant's incarceration
is a significant factor to courts from other jurisdictions
awarding benefits to temporarily disabled incarcerated claimants.
fifilfttlXflfifl»483 p.2d at 573-74 (deciding terminating temporary
total benefits was matter of public policy which should be
determined by legislature); ZfiuhjyB., 788 P.2d at 488 (reasoning
legislature's province to restrict ability of incarcerated
individuals to collect worker's compensation); In re soars. 713
P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1986) (holding determination of when payments
should be suspended is matter that should be left to
legislature).
Likewise, the absence of legislation providing for
suspension of workers' compensation benefits during incarceration
is also important in the analyeis of courts which evarded
benefits to permanently disabled claimants who ware incarcerated.
£*£ United ftiogare. 640 P.2d at 193 (awarding benefits because
incarceration was not voluntary removal from job market and there
was no legislation taking away these benefits); Crawford v.
Midwaet sttt) eo,. 517 So. 2d 918 (La. App. 1987) (holding
claimant entitled to benefits despite incarceration because
statute does not provide otherwise), fin. aJxft DeMara. 298 N.V.2d
at €47 (affirming total disability compensation despite felony
conviction because denial of benefits under such a situetion "is
not the province of the Board or the judicial branch**). But see
Packard v. Donald Sparry t Bone. 331 K.Y.8.2d 12€, 39 A.D.2d 622
(N.Y. App. Div. 1972) (holding claimant not entitled to
compensation during incarceration); White v. industrial cornm'n.
No. L-92-040, 1992 WL 341158 (Ohio App. Nov. 27, 1992)
(suspending permanent total disability benefits because
incarceration amounted to a voluntary abandonment of work).
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Utah's Workers' Compensation Act has no provision terminating
benefits because of a claimant's incarceration.
Omissions in the Workers' Compensation Act are significant
and the "statute should be applied according to its literal
wording.- Travlor Bros,, Inc./rrunin-colnon v. Overton. 736 P.2d
1048, 1052 (Utah App. 19B7). Significantly, as noted in their
caselaw, several states have enacted legislation which
specifically terminates workers' compensation benefits after a
claimant has been incarcerated.*
Furthermore, the Utah Legislature has chosen to restrict
workers1 compensation benefits under certein circumstances* For
example, section 35-1-14 provides for a fifteen percent reduction
in compensation for an employee's failure to use safety devices,
failure to obey employer's safety rule, or employee's
intoxication. £gjt Utah Code Ann. 5 35-1-14 (198S). Similarly,
section 35-1-45 suspends benefits when the accident was
"purposely self-inflicted.« ££. $ 35-1-45. Thus, it is clear
the Utah Legislature knows how to limit workers' compensation
benefits, and does so when it so desires.
We therefore hold the absence of a statutory provision
limiting workers' compensation benefits upon a claimant's
incarceretion mandates a conclusion that temporary total benefits
should be awarded to King. Moreover, the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act is based on contract principles and an
employee's right to benefits arises when he suffers e workrelated injury. Absent an explicit statutory provision, the
Industrial Commission is not free to reduce statutorily-created
benefits. "The Industrial commission is not free to legislate'
in areas apparently overlooked by our lawmakers or to exercise
power not expressly or impliedly granted to it by the
legislature, even in the name of fairness.91 qsvans v. Industrial
£fiLBUBJLQ# 790 P.2d 573, 576 (Utah App. 1990).
In Utah, workers' compensation is the employee's exclusive
remedy against an employer for an industrial injury, a fact which
further supports an award of benefits to Xing. £&£ Utah Code
Ann. S 35*1*60 (1968). Under our statutory scheme, King
relinquished his right to sue his employer for his industrial
injury in exchange for workers' compensation benefits. King's
incarceration would not have cost him the right to sue his
employer under the common law. Absent legislative action, that

22.
See, ftg., Whits v. Industrie! Comm'n. No. L-92-040, 1992
WL 348158 (Ohio App. Nov. 27, 1992)j Wood v. Beatrice Foods CQx,
813 P.2d 821 (Colo. App. 1991); Jones v. Department of
Corrections. 460 N.W.2d 229 (Mich. App. 1990).
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incarceration should not cost his his right to workers'
compensation.
The Industrial Comsiission contends Griffith v. Tndu«trial
Commiatjgn. 754 P.2d 981 (Utah App. 1988), supports the denial of
benefits in this case. In Griffith, we affirmed a denial of
benefits where the claimant's disability was prolonged due to a
delay in corrective surgery for reasons unrelated to the
industrial accident. However, the Industrial Commission's
reliance on Griffith is mispleced.
In Griffith, the claimant received temporary total
disability benefits for an industrial injury to his anXle. An
orthopedic surgeon evaluated his ankle and recommended surgical
reconstruction. The Commission concluded the healing period had
ended and the claimant's medical condition had stabilised. An
internist who evaluated the claimant's hypertension and asthma
advised that ankle surgery be postponed until the hypertension
and asthma were treated. The Industrial Commission determined
the employer was not liable for temporary total disability for
the period which the claimant's hypertension and asthma had to be
controlled so surgery could be safely performed. The Commission
reasoned that surgical repair had to be deleyed because of other
medical problems, not for further treatment of claimant's ankle.
In affirming the Commission's denial of temporary total
disability, we found "that the Commission's conclusion that
plaintiff's ankle injury had reached medical stability on May 2,
1985 . . . [was] not arbitrary and capricious because . . . [it
was] supported by substantial evidence on the record." Id. at
984.
Unlike King, in Griffith the claimant's condition had
reached stabilization, a prerequisite for termination of
temporary total disability payments,fifie.Booms v. Rapp Constr.

£&*., 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 1986). t£S2lA Greyhound Lines.
Inc. v. Wallace. 728 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Utah 1986); Reddish v.
Sentinel Consumer Prod.. 771 P.2d 1103, 1104 (Utah App. 1989).
In Griffith, workers' compensation benefits were properly
discontinued. Thus, Griffith provides no support for the
Industrial Commission's argument.
Counsel for the Industrial Commission also suggests we
should adopt a rule that as long as circumstances which delay the
claimant's surgery are beyond the control of the insurer, the
insurer should not be required to pay temporary total disability
compensation. Such a rule, however, makes no senss. It would
permit the insurer to terminate benefits whenever they deem the
claimant's surgery to be sufficiently "delayed," resulting in
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subjective and arbitrary determinations." Would tha Industrial
Commission terminate benefits if King's surgery was delayed only
eight days instead of eight months? Indeed, at oral argument
counsel for tha Industrial Commission indicated that if King's
disability had been prolongad for a shortar pariod tha Commission
would not have challenged the payment of disability benefits.
CONCLUSION
Because Utah's Workers' Compensation atatutea do not have
specific language limiting benefits for incarcerated recipients
of temporary total disability payments, such benefits must be
paid until the claimant's medical condition has stabilized. The
termination of benefits is a policy matter which must be
addreased by the Utah Legislature, not by thie court or by the
Industrial Commission. Accordingly, we affirm tha trial court's
ruling and remand this matter for determination of benefits.

Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge

I CONCUR:

Pain* 1» T* Greenwood/ Judge

RUSSON,

Associate presiding Judge (concurring in result):

I concur in the result. We have previously set forth the
proper standard of review for appeals from the Industrial
commission's denial of compensation under Utah Code Ann* $ 35-145 (19S8) in C r o n v. Baard of Review. 824 P.2d 1202, 1203-04
23. For example, under such a rule, an insurer could terminate a
claimant's temporary total disability compensation if only one
surgeon had the skill to perform corrective surgery but was
unable to schedule surgery for three months or vas unavailable
because he vas called to active service as a member of the
military reserves.
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(Utah App. 1992). At tha tint of that decision, tha proper postUAPA standard of review for appeals under aaction 35-1-45 was an
iaaue of first impression in Utah. In £££!&, ve determined that
section 35-1-45 contained no expresa or implied grant of
diacretion to the Industrial Commission. Ifl. at 1204. That
decision stands unchallenged as the correct lav on tha very point
raiaed in thia case, and tha majority expressly acknowledges this
in its opinion. Thus, in light of Cross. and tha doctrine of
stare daciais aa enunciated in fltgf v. Thurman. 203 Utah Adv.
Rep. 18, 25 (Utah 1993), I find the Majority'* protracted
examination of the appropriate standard of review in thia ease
unwarranted.

o
Leonard H. Russon,
Associate Presiding Judge
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